This paper examines the link between firm performance, board structure and top executive pay. We use a panel of firms from the Portuguese Stock Market, where the institutional context is very similar to most other European countries. The standard organizational structure is a single-tier board, which includes the CEO as well as executive and non-executive members. The results confirm a large effect of firm size on top executive compensation. However there is no relationship between the board remuneration and company performance. We examine whether the governance structure of companies is relevant in influencing top executive pay. Specifically, we consider the role of nonexecutive board members as mediators of the management and shareholders relationship. Our results suggest that firms with more non-executive board members pay higher wages to their executives. Furthermore, we find that firms with zero non-executive board members actually have less agency problems, and have a better alignment of shareholders' and managers' interests. These results cast some doubts on the effectiveness of independent board members incentive systems, and on their stated monitoring role.
Introduction
The growth in executive pay over the past decade has increased the attention given to the subject of executive compensation. Around the world, there is now a debate about the levels and quality of publicly traded companies' compensation arrangements (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , Hall and Liebman (1998) , Conyon and Murphy (2000) ). This topic became even more salient after the recent corporate scandals, and the important role that top executives played in them.
This paper contributes to the assessment of the executive pay landscape by examining the determinants of executive pay in a typical Continental European setting. In particular, we look at top executive compensation of companies listed in the Euronext Lisbon (Portuguese Stock Exchange), where companies' boards are commonly organized in a single-tier structure.
We investigate the determinants of managerial compensation, with a special emphasis on the relation between compensation and firm performance. Portuguese listed firms have a wide variety of board structures and compositions. We investigate their implications, particularly the role of non-executive board members.
Several studies have examined the relationships between measures of firm performance and top manager pay in the U.S.. Murphy (1999) provides a thorough review of the executive compensation literature, with an emphasis on U.S. data. Outside the U.S., there is limited evidence on the determinants of managerial pay. Kaplan (1994) compares Japanese and U.S. incentives, and finds that incentives are broadly similar. Conyon and Murphy (2000) compare executive pay in the U.S. and U.K., and find that the determinants are similar, although the institutional environment fosters very different magnitudes in the pay levels and relationships with size and performance.
Looking outside the U.S. may provide out of sample evidence of the results found there. In addition, it is interesting to check whether the main results are robust in a different setting, with very different institutional environment and firm governance structure. The corporate board structure in Portugal is very similar to most European countries. There is a single-tier system, without a separate supervising board. The single board comprises the CEO, other executive managers as well as non-executive directors. In this single-tier system, non-executive board members' prescribed role is to protect shareholders interests in key decisions of the company.
They have the duty to fill the gap between uninformed shareholders and informed executive managers.
We find that the size of the company is the main determinant of executive compensation.
Indeed our results suggest very large elasticities of pay relative to size (much larger than previous research has found in the U.K. or U.S.). However, performance is not associated with pay levels. For the empirical analysis we consider both aggregate management compensation, as well as its components: fixed and variable compensation. Not even when we look at the variable component of pay is executive compensation related to shareholders' wealth or accounting measures of performance. Our results are robust to a "changes" specification that addresses inference problems associated with a "levels" specification because of omitted variables. We use several control variables, most of which have the expected results. Importantly, we find that company risk is not a significant determinant of compensation. Together with the fact that compensation is not associated with performance, this suggests an important disconnect between managers' and investors' interests, which can pose serious problems for the future health of these companies.
We find an important role of non-executive board members in influencing pay levels. Contrary to expectations, top-executive remuneration is higher when companies have more nonexecutive board members. Also, we find that non-executive board members are not very successful in aligning shareholders and managers interests. Surprisingly, we find that firms with zero non-executive board members actually have a stronger relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance. These results suggest that to foster the board of directors' effective monitoring role, special attention needs to be paid to the role, quality and integrity of their non-executive directors. In particular, their real independence should be guaranteed.
Finally, our results cast some doubts on the effectiveness of some commonly used governance ratings. In theory, most companies in our sample have a good governance system, with a significant number of non-executive directors, and a substantial share of executive compensation in variable terms. In practice, neither variable compensation reflects firm performance nor non-executive directors help to align management and shareholders' interests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and institutional background to top management pay systems in Portugal. The results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper and discusses the implications of our study for the governance of publicly trade companies.
Board Composition and Compensation Data
Besides the U.S., not many countries in the world require companies to disclose top management pay. In Portugal, the stock market regulator (CMVM) has introduced in 2001 several corporate governance recommendations. One of these is that listed companies must disclose in their Annual Governance Reports (part of their Annual Reports), the payments to the top executives. Each company reports the following data: total board pay, executive board members pay, and non-executive board members pay. In addition, the compensation is broken down into fixed and variable components for each type of board member.
Our sample consists of all firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. For each firm, we hand-collect data on compensation from the companies' Annual Reports and Annual Governance Reports.
Our final sample consists of 58 companies that are (were) listed in Euronext Lisbon from [2002] [2003] [2004] . Table 1 reports the distribution of firm/year observations across industries and size categories.
Following Conyon and Murphy (2000) we categorize firms into four broad industry groups: manufacturers, utilities, financial services and others. Manufacturing is the largest group, with 40% of the observations. Finance sector comprises 15% of the sample, but they account for 30% of the total market capitalization.
We categorize companies into three size groups (large, medium, small) based on their market capitalization. "Large" firms are the top 20%, "Small" firms the bottom 20%. Between percentiles 20 and 80 of market capitalization, we classify the firms as "Medium". The cuts are made based on each company median market capitalization in the sample period.
A number of control variables are part of our empirical design. Accounting performance, firm size and book-to-market equity ratio are from Worldscope. Stock price and dividend payment information are from Datastream. We also obtain historical information on index constituents from Euronext Lisbon. The main Portuguese index contains 20 companies. Together, these firms (also known as PSI 20 constituents) constitute more than 80% of the total market capitalization of the Portuguese market.
Management structure in Portuguese listed companies is similar to many other European countries. There is a single-tier structure. The corporate board of the company includes the CEO and a varying number of other board members that can be either executive or nonexecutive. Each executive board member oversees different functional areas of the company (finance, marketing, human resources, strategy, etc.). Non-executive board members have an assigned role of monitoring management of the company, filling the gap between uninformed shareholders and fully informed executive managers. Table 2 reports summary statistics of the number of board members companies have, including their composition (executives / non-executives). A typical board has approximately 8 members (5 executive and 3 non-executive). Board size varies widely across companies. Large companies have significantly larger boards, both in terms of executives and non-executive board members. Companies that belong to the main index have on average 11 board members, whereas smaller firms, that do not belong to the PSI20 have 6. The composition of boards also varies. On average, boards include 33% non-executive board members, but within our sample, almost one-third of the companies have no non-executive director. The maximum percentage of non-executive board members is 80%. Though board size clearly increases with company size, the trend is even more clear for non-executive board members. Indeed, small companies have on average less than 2 non-executive board members, whereas large companies have almost 8.
We define the executives' total compensation in a given year as the sum of the executives' salary (fixed part) and bonuses (variable component). Stock options granted to the executives are not included into the variable component, because firms are not required to disclose an euro value for these plans. Thus, like much of the literature, the annual compensation figures we use do not include a source of additional compensation for many executives. However, the omission of these less visible forms of compensation may not pose as serious a problem as in the case of the U.S.. Over the time period under consideration, these forms of compensation are not as wide-spread in Portugal as in the U.S. Anyway, the omission of these forms of compensation would not be a problem insofar as movements in these forms of compensation and cash compensation are correlated (Kaplan (1994)). Table 3 reports total board compensation, which aggregates executive and non-executive board members. In Tables 4 and 5 we present the descriptive statistics for components of compensation, separately for executive and non-executive board members.
As expected, executive board members have much larger wages, both fixed and variable.
Executive members receive in this sample period an average of 385.000 per year (Table 4 , Panel B), and a significant part of it comes from the variable component -23% (Table 4 , panel C). The overall level of pay of executive members is in line with pay levels in the U.S. or U.K..
For example, Conyon and Murphy (2000) report an average pay of GBP 291,000 in the U.K. and 317,000 in the U.S.. Large companies pay executive board members around 1 Million euros a year, whereas small companies pay 10 times less (around 100.000). The structure of pay also differs significantly across sizes. Board members of large companies receive almost 50% variable compensation, whereas in small companies, most of the compensation if fixed. Table 5 reports average pay levels and structure of non-executive board members. From Panel A we see that on average companies spend around 200.000 Euros a year with their nonexecutive board members wages (530.000 in large companies, and 35.000 in smaller ones).
In Panel B we see that the average pay to each of these board members is 55.000, most of which is fixed. Across all sizes, less than 10% of non-executive board members' wages comes from the variable component (Panel C). There are some trends however. Over the time period, companies have more non-executive board members, and they pay them more as well. On average, in 2002 a company had 2 non-executive board members, which rose to 5 in 2004.
The size effect of managerial pay is also very pronounced. Non-executive board members of large companies receive on average 57.000, and in small companies the average pay to a nonexecutive director is 17.000. Looking at index membership provides even sharper contrasts.
Companies that belong to the main index pay on average 92.000 to each non-executive board member, whereas companies that do not belong to the index pay four times less.
What Determines Executive Compensation
In this section we study the determinants of managerial compensation in this single-tier environment. We analyze the roles of company size and performance in influencing managerial compensation. In addition, we study other determinants of compensation, such as industry, risk and growth of a company. Given the data on board structure, we investigate the potentially disciplinary role that non-executive board members have in influencing compensation and incentive schemes.
Pay -Size Relation
One of the most consistent findings in the executive compensation literature is the relation between pay and company size. The summary statistics of Table 3 to 5 show similar results: main index constituents and large firms pay much larger sums to their managers. Underlying this size effect is the notion that bigger companies require better managers. The costs in shareholder wealth of incorrect decision-making are directly related to the size of a company.
Also, larger firms have more complex operations that make monitoring more difficult (Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ) and increase the potential for moral hazard. The additional complexity of larger firms requires more able managers who have higher equilibrium wages (Baker and Hall (2004)).
Following the literature (e.g., Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) ), we use sales to control for size 1 . In order to understand how executive pay varies across different sized companies, we estimate the following regression equation:
1 All the results of this paper hold when assets are used as an alternative measure of size.
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Where PAY is the total board pay, SIZE is total company's sales within the year. The coefficient β represents the elasticity of board compensation to company size. Table 6 We separately estimate (1) for different compensation variables, and the different board members. We present the pay-size elasticities of these different estimations in Table 7 . Columns
(1)-(3) use as dependent variable total compensation of all board members, whereas columns (4)-(6) use per-capita compensation. Regarding executive members of the board, we can see that their total pay has an elasticity of 50% to firm size. However, the separate components of compensation react differently to changes in size. The elasticity of the variable compensation is much larger than the fixed one (64% vs. 36%), suggesting that a significant portion of the pay differential of large vs. small firms comes from the variable compensation part. The third row reports results of a regression of compensation of non-executive board members on firm size. Interestingly, non-executives' wage is also very sensitive to company size (more than 0.60 elasticity). This is consistent with the statistics of Table 5 , which show that large companies, and companies that belong to the main index pay non-executive directors four times more than smaller companies. Columns (4)-(6) look at per-capita compensation. The basic results are unchanged, though the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller. The elasticity of non-executive compensation to company size is larger than the one of executives, and the variable component of pay is significantly more influenced by company size than the fixed part. This is consistent with the evidence from Tables (3) and (4), where it is shown that larger companies rely much more on variable compensation than smaller ones.
Pay -Performance Relation
One of the main goals of effective corporate governance is to solve the agency problem suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Firm managers often have goals that conflict with the interests of shareholders. Agency theory suggests that it is good for shareholders to align incentives of managers with their own. The typical principal-agent model suggests that shareholders should contract with managers' compensation that is related to the actions they take.
Since actions are not directly observable, a contract that aims to maximize shareholders objectives must be devised. One way to do this (align the interests) is to make managers' compensation a function of firm performance (Murphy (1985) , Kaplan (1994) ).
The executive compensation literature (see review by Murphy (1999)) suggests that compensation should be related to measures of stock-based performance, not only because this is the desired by shareholders, but also because high stock returns should signal positive information on the actions taken by managers.
We begin by exploring the relationship between levels of salary and bonus and firm performance. We estimate the following regression equation:
where PAY i,t is the annual pay to executives of Firm i in Year t, and RET i,t is the annual stock return of their firm.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of the level of compensation on stock market performance. The first column presents the results of a regression where the dependent variable is the annual total board compensation. The elasticity of salary and bonus with respect to changes in firm value is about 0.06, and insignificantly different from 0. The second column reports results for a regression of fixed salary of all board members, and the third column examines their variable component of compensation.
Column (4) reports the results when the dependent variable is the per-capita average compensation of board members. The coefficients on performance are always insignificant. Whether we look at total, fixed or variable compensation, the results suggest that board compensation is not significantly related to firm performance.
The analysis is repeated in Columns (5) to (8) The results above are based on a "levels" specification, which could be affected by omitted variables and other biases. Thus, to further test pay-performance sensitivities we examine changes in management compensation. Our procedure is similar to Jensen and Murphy (1990) and we consider a "changes" version of specification (2) wherein we relate changes in compensation to firm performance:
where ∆ log(PAY i,t ) is the annual rate of growth of Pay of Firm i in Year t, and RET i,t is the annual stock return. In short, Equation (3) simply states that growth in management pay depends on their firm's performance. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of this specification.
The results of the changes regressions are very similar to the results of Panel A (levels).
In particular, the conclusions for the performance are unaffected. Whether looking at the total board, or only at executive board members, the results of Table 8 suggest that changes in compensation are not associated with changes in shareholder wealth.
The previous results are obtained in a univariate regression. We now control for other factors known to affect compensation. First, we control for firm size. The most consistent result from different studies of managerial pay is that firm size is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels. Given the evidence of the previous section, we also expect size to be a major determinant of the board compensation. Second, we control for a firm's level of risk. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find that the return variance is an important determinant of the level of remuneration and this was robust across other measures of firm risk. This fits with principal agent theory since risk averse executives demand higher salaries and less comprised as performance-based when risk is high in order to bare less of the risk.
We introduce the volatility of share price returns as a proxy for risk as an additional control variable.
Third, we control for the effect of investment opportunities, as firms that grow more presumably need better managers and are ready to pay them more. We use the Book-to-Market ratio as an inverse of a proxy for growth opportunities.
In addition to the above control variables, we investigate the role of board composition in influencing managerial compensation. The board structure variables may play some role in shaping the structure of the total board pay. A higher proportion of non-executive board members may imply greater monitoring so that executives' pay is set at a lower rate. Alternatively if there are few executive board members they may have more roles and responsibility and actually require higher remuneration. We introduce as additional regressors the total size of the board, as well as the proportion of non-executive board members.
We use industry dummy variables (IND) to capture unexplained variations across industries. The industries are industrial and manufacturing, financial, public utility, and other sectors. We also control for index membership, by introducing a dummy that equals one if a certain company belongs to the main index in a certain year.
To study determinants of executive compensation, and the role of performance in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following equation:
where PAY i,t is the annual pay to executives of Firm i in Year t, and RET i,t is the annual stock return. SIZE is the log of total sales, RISK is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns within the year, BT M is the Book-to-Market ratio (inverse proxy for growth opportunities), N total is the total number of board members and INDEPENDENT is the fraction of nonexecutive members in the company board. D PSI20 is a dummy for index membership. θ are the coefficients on the industry dummies 2 . Table 9 reports estimates of Equation (4) using these additional controls. Companies do not pay more to their managers when the company performed well. The basic results from the univariate analysis remain. Board compensation is not significantly related to shareholders performance (columns (1) to (4)). In columns (5) to (8) Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) ).
The coefficient on risk is not significant, suggesting that it is not a significant determinant of board compensation. The results are similar for the executive board members 3 . Overall, the results suggest that managers are not compensated for managing riskier companies.
The coefficients on the INDEPENDENT variable merit some attention. When looking at the total board (columns 1 to 4) the results suggest that total board pay slightly decreases when it includes more non-executive board members. This is natural, since in section 2 we reported much lower pay levels for non-executive board members, and mostly fixed. Interestingly, non-executive board members seem to have an impact on the pay level of executive managers.
When we look at per-capita compensation of executives (Table 9 -Columns (6) to (8)), the results suggest the the individual pay of each executive director is higher when there is a large fraction of non-executive members in the board. Total pay to executive board members, and particularly the fixed component of salary increases significantly when boards include more non-executive board members (Column (7)). These findings contradict prior expectations from agency theory. If the number of non-executive board members is used as a proxy for the level of monitoring then the expectation is that the pay of the executive board members is negatively related to it. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with previous findings for the U.S. and U.K.. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Cosh and Hughes (1997) have explored the issue of executive compensation and the structure of the board though both in the context of an individual director's pay rather then the whole board. Their results suggest that larger boards pay their CEO more. They also found that in firms with a higher proportion of non-executives 3 Unreported results using idiosyncratic risk of each company as an alternative proxy for risk provide similar results. Stocks with high idiosyncratic risk actually pay less to their managers, controlling for the other factors.
the CEO was paid more. Cosh (1997) using a set of U.K. firms also found that firms with a higher proportion of non-executives paid their CEO more.
The financial firms coefficients are always positive and significant. Controlling for other factors that affect compensation (size, risk, etc.), the estimated coefficients indicate significant premiums for executives in the finance sector. The results are similar when one looks only at executive board members. Controlling for all the other factors, executives in the financial sector are paid 50% more relative to their peers. Looking at the individual components of pay, we find that most of the premium enjoyed by finance executives is in their variable salary.
The fixed salary is not significantly higher than in other sectors, but the variable component is much larger (70%).
In addition to the above mentioned size effect, we find that index membership significantly influences managerial wages. Indeed, the coefficients on the index membership dummy (PSI20) suggest that, controlling for all the other company characteristics (including size) and industry groups, wages of board members of PSI20 companies are paid 30-40% more than other managers. This index membership effect suggests a very different labor market for executives of top companies. Given the probable additional regulatory oversight, visibility of the company and investor relations of index members, they reward their managers with much higher wages.
One alternative explanation for the lack of pay-performance relationship is the possibility that companies do not use financial markets as their main financing source, and thus stock prices are not deemed appropriate measures of firm performance. We test this hypothesis by considering accounting measures of performance, namely Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Table 10 reports the pay-performance coefficients of this multivariate analysis using ROE as the performance metric. The main results are unchanged. Table 11 reports the results of the multivariate estimation using ROA as independent variable. The conclusion remains. There is no significant relationship between compensation and accounting performance. Higher (lower) ROE and ROA are not translated into significantly higher (lower) wages for managers of the company. Furthermore, as in the case of market-based performance measures (Table 9) , not even the variable component of management pay is significantly associated with accounting profitability. Executive pay could potentially be related to decisions taken by the board in the past, or could be a reward/punishment for past firm performance. We explore alternative specifications that use lagged ROE and ROA and find similar results.
The Role of Non-Executive Board Members
There is a clear trend during the sample period for higher numbers of non-executive members in companies boards. On average, in 2002 a company had 2 non-executive board members, which rose to 5 in 2004. During this period the average pay of these non-executive board members doubled. The evidence from Table 5 suggests a very strong size effect in nonexecutive pay levels. Indeed, companies that belong to the main index pay on average 92.000 to each non-executive board members, whereas companies that do not belong to the index pay four times less. Together with the fact that index membership significantly increases the number of non-executive board members, this suggests a very particular labor market for non-executives members. As companies reach a certain size threshold, they actively seek (and reward) a higher number of non-executive board members (perhaps to comply with regulators' recommendations and additional visibility of main index companies).
To further examine the monitoring role of non-executive board members, we conduct two sets of estimations. We estimate the multivariate equation (4) separately for firms with and without non-executive board members. Table 12 reports the results of these estimations.
Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable total board pay. We can see that for the subset of firms with zero non-executive board members, pay levels are actually related to returns.
On the other hand, for companies with one or more non-executive board members, the payperformance relationship vanishes. In columns (3) and (4) we look at the individual pay level of each executive director for these two subsets of firms. The results suggest that executive board members' pay is only related to shareholders performance for those firms with zero non-executive board members. Together with the results from Tables 9-11, these results cast some doubts on the monitoring role of these non-executive board members. Though main index companies rely more and more on non-executive board members (their number doubled in the last 3 years), they do not seem very effective in aligning managers and shareholders interests 4 .
Although monitoring is their main prescribed duty, in practice the results question whether they are really able to carry out this "watchdog role" effectively. One possibility that might explain these findings is the lack of a market for reputation. Indeed, if the labor market for non-executive board members is very ineffective (or inexistent), then reputation as effective defenders of shareholders interests is not a serious concern for them. A related problem is their lack of incentives to challenge managers. Given the high wages paid (and relatively low effort required), these non-executive board directorships can be highly attractive positions. Nonexecutive directors are expected to supervise and be independent from the management team.
However, high compensation, together with a lack of labor market suggests that there are few incentives for non-executive directors to really act as guardians of shareholders interests. In practice, they have little to gain from their prescribed role, but a lot to loose.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the executive pay literature by examining the determinants of top executive compensation of companies listed in the Euronext Lisbon (Portuguese Stock Exchange). We investigate the determinants of managerial compensation, with a special emphasis on the relation between compensation and firm performance. Though there is a wide variation the board structure and composition, Portuguese boards have distinct features, that are common across Continental Europe. Our dataset allows us to investigate the role of nonexecutive board members in mediating shareholders' and managers' relations and interests.
Broadly, our evidence is consistent with a strong size factor in executive compensation, as well as a significant premium for executives in the finance sector. However, our results suggest that company performance is not significantly related to executive compensation. We also find that the risk of a company, measured by the standard deviation of stock returns is not a significant determinant of pay. This is consistent with the non-existent pay-performance relation.
Neither is pay related to shareholders' wealth, nor is managerial pay related to the risk of the equity holders. Managers are not compensated for managing riskier companies, which is natural, since they are not compensated (penalized) by good (bad) returns to shareholders equity.
Interestingly, not even variable compensation is related to performance, either market-based, or accounting based. Based on the raw data, variable compensation represents a substantial share of total compensation. In practice, our results suggest that variable compensation is very rigid, and indeed not very variable.
Looking at board composition, we find that non-executive board members do not have a strong monitoring role. Wages are higher when companies have more non-executive board members. Furthermore, our estimations suggest that companies with zero non-executive board members actually have a stronger alignment between managers and shareholders interests.
Given our results, the main goal of corporate executives is to enlarge their companies.
Indeed, the size premium found is much larger than other studies have documented for the U.S. and U.K.. Also, there is a very significant premium for executives of companies that enter the main stock market index, both for executives, and non-executive board members.
Overall, the results suggest an important disconnect between investors and managers rewards. Compensation is not related to shareholders wealth, nor do shareholders have any mechanism to influence it. Though companies begin to have more non-executive board members, they have a very minor monitoring job. The results actually suggest that very few com-panies have what is really considered an independent director, that looks after shareholders interests.
These results also raise some doubts on corporate governance ratings/rankings that simply check for the existence of certain features in Annual Reports or organizational structures. In this sample, governance is apparently good, with a large fraction of variable compensation, and a significant number of non-executive directors. However, digging further the real data suggests that what seems variable is not really variable, and that non-executive directors are not really performing their prescribed role. (4)- (6) use the Per-Capita Compensation. * means significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%.
(1) is the total number of board members and
INDEPENDENT is the fraction of non-executive members in the company board. PSI20 is a dummy for index membership. The equation is estimated with industry dummies for Manufacturing, Finance, Utilities and Others. Absolute values of T-statistics are presented below the estimated coefficients. * means significant at 5% and ** significant at 1%.
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(1) (4) examine PerCapita compensation of Executives. Return is the annual performance of the firm's stock, SIZE is the log of total sales, RISK is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns within the year, BT M is the Book-to-Market ratio, N total is the total number of board members and
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